This paper examines the neoliberal ideals that underpin participation and citizenship in the smart city and their replication mechanisms at European level. We examine self-proclaimed 'citizen-focus' projects funded by or aligned to the European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and Communities (EIP-SCC) by way of analysing policy documents and interviews with key stakeholders of smart city initiatives at European level and the Smart City Expo World Congress in Barcelona (SCEWC 2017). We suggest that smart cities as currently conceived enact a blueprint of neoliberal urbanism and promote a form of neoliberal citizenship. Supranational institutions like the EIP-SCC act at a multi-scalar level, connecting diverse forms of neoliberal urbanism while promoting policy agendas and projects that perform neoliberal citizenship in the spaces of the everyday. Despite attempts to recast the smart city as 'citizenfocused', smart urbanism remains rooted in pragmatic, instrumental and paternalistic discourses and practices rather than those of social rights, political citizenship, and the common good. In our view, if smart cities are to become truly 'citizen-focused' an alternative conception of smart citizenship needs to be deployed, one that enables an effective shift of power and is rooted in rights, entitlements, community, participation, commons, and ideals beyond the market.
Introduction
efficiency, competitiveness, and value-for-money that pave the way to strong austerity policies (Peck 2012) . At the same time, financial capital, increasingly central to innovation-led growth, has been strengthened through market re-regulation which protects short-term and risk-averse returns (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013) , with cities being not just the sites of production and experimentation of technologies, but the ultimate target market (Rossi, 2017) .
Indeed, while visiting the Smart City Expo World Congress (SCEWC, Barcelona 2017) and talking to many private-sector representatives, engineers, and CEOs, it appeared clear to us that private companies are ultimately, if not exclusively, relying on public money to expand their smart initiatives. Mayors and city officials were seen overwhelmingly as customers, the smart interlocutors who are willing to invest in a problem-solving technology. Two complementary processes work to enable such a shift. First, cities struggling with tight budgets become increasingly reliant on competitive funding from supra-national bodies in order to implement technologies and services -although the neoliberal discourse downplays this sizeable public investment in critical infrastructures and skills (see Mazzucato, 2011) . Second, austerity is driving city administrations towards outsourcing and procurement of smart solutions that are purported as necessary to cities own competitiveness (best practices among themselves) and as energy/labour-saving (best practices within themselves) -although savings and efficiencies can only be realised after significant start-up investment and on-going service contracts which, after pilot funding runs out, are bound to be sought within the market constraints of competitiveness and profitability.
Smart cities, then, have emerged as the latest, tech-led phase of the entrepreneurial city (Hollands, 2008; Shelton, Zook and Wiig, 2015) , through which private interests seek to capture public assets and services by offering technological solutions to urban problems (e.g., congestion, emergency response, utility and service delivery). Dublin in Ireland illustrates this phasing, adopting ideas of entrepreneurial planning in the 1990s, the creative city discourse in the 2000s, and finally the smart city in the 2010s (MacLaran and Kelly, 2014; Coletta, Heaphy and Kitchin, 2017) . While setting appropriate goals for cities via systems of urban benchmarking, the neoliberal smart city aims to attract foreign direct investment, offering areas of the city as testbeds to pilot new technologies, fostering innovative indigenous start-up sectors or digital hubs, and attracting mobile creative elites. Intra-city competition fits well with a speculative approach to housing, privatisation of space, and attraction of more affluent buyers, all characteristics of neoliberal urbanism which conceives urban land via exchange value rather than use value (e.g., Kitchin et al., 2012) . Thus, there are concerns as to the extent to which smart city practices in regeneration programmes, such as Living Labs and hackathons, might act rather as a magnet for the in-flow and retention of 'creative classes' and as gateways for gentrification (Cardullo, Kitchin and Di Feliciantonio 2018) . In other words, the latest hype around smart technologies has reinforced an already winning neoliberal discourse on city growth. Ultimately, we concur with Brenner and Schmid (2015, pages 156-157) when they suggest the dominant smart city discourse merges different layers in a meta-narrative around global urbanism: urban triumphalism (contemporary cities represent the latest expressions of a progressive historical development of human society, technology and governance), technoscientific urbanism (information technology corporations aggressively marketing a technical 'fix' for urban messiness), and urban sustainability (cities resemble "technologically controlled islands of eco-rationality" dislodged from the broader territorial formations in which they are embedded).
To this, we would add smart urbanism purports a form of urban citizenship rooted in civic paternalism and stewardship, individual autonomy and freedom of 'choice', and personal responsibilities and obligations that are framed within 'commonsensical' constraints that promote market-led provision of services and infrastructures, rather than being rooted in civil, social and political rights and within notions of the 'common good'. In the neoliberal smart city, in fact, 'choice' is extended in space and time thanks to the proliferation of interconnected and location-aware devices. However, such devices are, in practice, powered by corporate ecosystems such as Google-Android, Apple-iPhone or Amazon-Echo, made operational through contracts with private network providers, and exploited by incredibly vast and transnational platform economies (again: Google, Apple, Amazon, etc.). Apparently free from legal interfaces and physical market boundaries, the entrepreneurial smart citizen is in constant search for affirmation and improvement (see also Ong 2006; Brown 2016) . At the same time, smart citizens are disciplined, nudged and controlled within new forms of governmentalitywhat Vanolo (2014) terms 'smartmentality' -enacted through technologies such as traffic management systems, control rooms, smart grids and meters, that seek to modulate behaviour and produce neoliberal subjects (Kitchin, Coletta and McArdle, 2017b) . Smart technologies, in the forms of networked bodily and locational sensors and real-time big data streams, concur to the establishment of a neoliberal subject within the constraints of individual responsibility -for instance, by charting bodily progress, counting steps, or measuring diets, and then by analysing own data and, eventually, recalibrating self-behaviour (see Davies, 2015) . Han (2017) calls it "smartpolitics", arguing that while a politics of disciplining, punishing and perfecting the body was central to Foucault's notion of biopower, now neoliberalism has tapped into and is exploiting the psychic realm: "instead of forbidding and depriving, [neoliberalism] works through pleasing and fulfilling". This chimes with the notion that software is "seductive" because it promises rewards for use, but at the same time it conditions through automation and forms of control, especially when the technology used is not optional and 'black-boxed' (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) . With the coupling of personal and environmental sensor data with the affordance of digital networking technologies, smartness can lead to a "gamification effect" which constitutes notions of 'good' or 'bad' citizen/user through disciplinary dispositives of ordering or ranking (Vanolo, 2017; see also Gabrys, 2014) . According to Han (2017) , the neoliberal subject is not a "labourer" any more, but a "project".
In addition to the above mechanisms of subjectification, there are concerns that increased reliance on big data analytics, city-sensing, and social-media interactions, activated within a framework of technological solutionism, might privilege on-time and all-encompassing swaths of data and algorithm-led planning decisions over political discussion and agonist processes of governance (e.g., Kitchin, 2014; Vanolo, 2014) . For critics, in fact, the dominant smart city discourse has been justifying a "largely depoliticized ideological rubric" (Brenner and Schmid, 2015 , page 158), merging techno-scientific solutionism and ecological preoccupations as "consensually agreed metaphors" (Swyngedouw, 2011 (Swyngedouw, , 2016 or "stage-managed consensus" (MacLeod, 2011) . Even when smart city projects herald more effective forms of active citizenship and citizen empowerment -e.g., Living Labs, citizen-science and open source software -they often do so by co-opting citizen contribution into the wider economic landscape of efficiency, environmental imperatives and a business-driven city (Perng, Kitchin and Mac Donncha, 2017; Perng, 2018) . In other words, rather than fostering subversive ideals of experimentation, city hacking or beta-version infrastructures, smart innovation appears more an exercise of replication via short-term and risk-averse finance (see Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013 ) and via well-routed 'models' and 'best practices' over unanimous goals, whether the ecological futures of the planet or the imperatives of growth. Wendy Brown (2016, page 4) sums up well the paradox in which the neoliberal subject is embedded: "As neoliberal citizenship sets loose the individual to take care of itself, it also discursively binds the individual to the well-being of the whole".
In the reminder of the paper, we consider the formation of the neoliberal subject and citizenship by examining the ideological underpinnings of delivery, replication, and participation of most 'citizen-focus' projects within the EIP-SCC. We ask: how are citizens being conceived within the smart city, and who is the 'citizen-focused' smart city being built for? In so doing, we chart how 'the smart city' works as a multi-scalar and heterogeneous In part, this is because there has been little sustained grassroots attempts to create community-led smart cities, with communities tending to organize their activities and activism around addressing social and environmental issues through political and policy solutions rather than technological ones. It is also because putting together a large, multimillion euro bid is timeconsuming and a complex task, carrying high financial or staffing overheads to facilitate a citizen-led bid. What this means is that in most cases, the only entities that can apply are government agencies, companies or universities. Moreover, given the complexities of building a consortium of multiple stakeholders across several locations, adding 'non-expert' citizens into the mix is a significant additional overhead. Instead, the consortium makes a pitch for funding for a project that is designed to deliver certain outcomes (e.g., reduce energy or increase sustainable transport) and only when it has the funding in hand does it seek to engage with local communities.
"You can't do the engagement before the project because obviously you don't have the funding. And what a lot of people don't realise is the type of engagement I am talking about is not like a quick consultation, a day or a week or a one event, it is a long deep conversation relationship building that takes place over months… So the engagement part is where we shouldn't have set deliverables because it is about engaging the community and understanding the issues." [SC1] Any engagement that occurs after funding, even if designed to be citizen-centric, has then to meet pre-determined milestones and fulfil the deliverables of the contract, meaning citizens have limited scope to reframe the initiative around their concerns and desires. In a public meeting we attended at one UK Lighthouse project, for instance, citizens questioned the already established targets for implementing electric cars as a substitute for traditional more polluting cars and instead argued for measures to reduce the overall number of cars in their city and for an increase in green areas. More than one project manager complained to us about the lack of flexibility initiatives have in changing goals and project outlines or objectives:
"There is too much translation between these big projects with all their deliverables and real people to make the connections, it is just really, really hard to do that in any way that reflects the real concerns of people, I think." [SC2] As one project leader of a small 'citizen engagement' part in a much larger 'citizen-focus' project suggests, "what would make a huge difference is if funders had the confidence in an approach to allow responsiveness to community, to not have set goals". [SC5] Instead, project objectives are vetted through "a whole series of spreadsheets" with the predominance of quantitative indicators and benchmarks that appear at odd with the uncertainty of the innovation process (it is a risky endeavour, otherwise it would not be innovation), and with its cumulative and collective character (change takes time and it involves many different stakeholders and interests) (see Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013) .
The EIP-SCC claims their Commitments "move away from a traditional consultative approach towards a disruptive, non-conventional and pragmatic one… so citizens' voices are not only heard, but are instrumental in solution design" (EU Action Cluster, 2015, page 24).
There is little evidence to support this assertion. In the smart city vision fostered by the EIP-SCC citizens are encouraged, at best, to help provide solutions to practical issues which would respond to local and contextual situations -these are forms of placation, such as producing an app during a hackathon, or feeding back on a development plan. They are not encouraged to formulate or lead initiatives or propose communitarian projects -such as sharing initiatives, or urban forms of co-ownership of the common good (e.g., co-ops or shared infrastructures) -or to draw an alternative to the fundamental political rationalities shaping an issue, or to reimagine a political debate. In this sense, "citizen-focused" is often just a buzzword to draw funding.
In our view, the paradox of fostering increased choice with less meaningful participation for citizens is due to the contradictory coming together of forms of technocratic and marketdriven governance with poorly understood and practised notions of conviviality, commoning, civic deliberation, resource sharing, trust building, and other face-to-face forms of confrontation and living that make polis and communities work. While claiming to increase meaningful forms of direct participation, neoliberal governance works within structuring bureaucratic and ideological path dependencies and often hinges on computational forms of participation which are set already within circumscribed software environments and solutions (Gabrys, 2014;  Kitchin, Coletta and McArdle, 2017b) . This is often recognized by their own architects, as another project leader told us: "I am starting to think really there is too wide a gap between how these projects are working and what the concerns and issues that real people are facing in their everyday lives". [SC9] As Wendy Brown (2016, page 7) notes: 'In public life, governance displaces liberal democratic questions of justice with technical formulations of problems, and questions of right with questions of effectiveness; even questions of legality with those of efficacy'.
Marketization of service provision
If the leading ethos of smart city intervention at European level, as set and operationalized by the EIP-SCC, is not really citizen empowerment or their control on the direction of urban change, we need to ask what are the real motivations and goals for setting up such a smart city programme for "communities"? As suggested above, a politics of austerity (combined with EU law) pressures cities and other public institutions to privatize and outsource public provisions under the 'smart city' agenda. In the H2020 call for smart cities this is recognised explicitly: one of the main forms of impact for initiatives seeking funding is to attract significant private investment in the delivery of public services. So we learn that a "good impact" would be to show a reduction of "the technical and financial risks in order to give confidence to investors for investing in large scale replication" (European Commission, 2016, page 111), so that eventually "private capital can take over further investments at low technical and financial risks" (page 108). In other words, there is an offer, or more likely an obligation, for the socialisation of risks in exchange for the privatisation of services and, eventually, profits. At times, the slippage between citizens, users, and consumers is evident: the H2020-SCC call suggests as a meaningful impact that "the active participation of consumers must be demonstrated" (page 107, our emphasis). In contrast, we find only one mention of "citizens" in the impact section, with the goal of making "local energy system more secure, more stable and cheaper for the citizens and public authorities" (page 111). But what kind of 'citizen' is implied here? The installation of smart meters in their own home, or the incorporation of renewable energy source, hardly gives citizens/consumers an "active participation" or a say in the running of the electricity company or grid. Rather, the citizen is a consumer in a marketplace of privatised utility provision and the product (as data). S/he is useful to the extent to which s/he can produce revenue and valuable data for the company and for the deliverable of the Commitment itself.
It is in this climate of increased marketization of citizens into consumers, users, and dataproducts and of provision of 'efficient' services that we need to frame citizen participation and empowerment. In this context, in fact, even citizen engagement can become a "lucrative and expanding business", as the CEO of a city platform app declared to us [SC10] . We would concur that innovation-led growth shapes and creates new markets, for instance by setting goals and and public investment solutions, and citizen-centred deliberative democracy -not simply citizen-engagement conducted after the solution has already been decided (Kitchin, 2014) .
Nudging behaviours
Parallel to this emphasis on technological solutionism, we observe the increasing trend of envisioning citizens as 'learners', with the aim of educating them as to how to best use resources or adopt a certain behaviour. The European Commission has set the key objective for smart cities as "transition towards a low carbon and resource efficient economy" -where urban EU populations are said to consuming "70% of our energy" (European Commission 2016, p. 105).
As this narrative suggests, the implementation of smart cities is a shared and urgent paradigm for our planet since it becomes evermore urbanised. This led to a cottage industry of apps which seek to educate and change behaviour, steering and nudging people towards an efficient model of urban growth and with a commitment at improving "their quality of city life". Increasingly, public engagement and participation take the form of "gamification" (see Vanolo, 2017) . For instance, Clicks and Links 7 is a company who promotes "behavioural change through gaming and virtual reality" within CITY-ZEN, 8 a project that aims to engage and educate citizens to energy-efficient infrastructures. On a similar vein, Commitment 6939 wants to deliver an "empowering game" aimed at 8-14 year old children to support behavioural change leading to achieve energy reduction in social housing. Commitment 7422 offers a "Cooperative Game on energy efficiency and use of renewable energy" between neighbourhoods within a metropolitan region and between different EU cities. Commitment 7788 too advocates the use of smart platforms and gaming to foster "citizens behavioural change" for energy saving purposes and, in addition, offers the possibility for service providers "to gather a quick picture of [citizens] current sentiment".
While one city official said she was seeing the "already changing behaviour" of her fellow citizens recruited in a smart meters pilot for reducing electricity consumption [SC8], some interviewees expressed deep concerns around the suitability of smart meters as indicators for a change of behaviour:
"We have talked quite a lot about it [change of behaviour] and how we measure that. We need to look at the quantitative data that we might get from smart meters but we want to understand the everyday lives of some people we are working with" [SC6].
Towards a different kind of smart city
During our fieldwork we met many young and enthusiast officers, developers, and community engagement advocates who clearly believed and supported the smart city vision, and especially the notion of a 'citizen-focused' one, and without doubt are conducting a great job trying to slot digital and networked technologies into the everyday life of cities. For us, one problem is that they work forcibly within a neoliberal framework that underpins their initiatives: through the framework of the EC funding schemes and the process by which projects are conceived, evaluated and delivered, neoliberal ideals are transmitted in detail and modelled on the dogmas of efficiency (saving scarce energy), sustainability (changing policy orientation in the long term), and freedom of choice (although instrumental to market imperatives). Our analysis has highlighted the extent to which EIP-SCC supports and is inspired by a neoliberal vision of a 'citizen-focused' smart city, and promotes active forms of neoliberal citizenship and governance through their discourse, configuration and deployment. Such visions, practices and technologies are framed as commonsensical and apolitical yet, as we have illustrated, are deeply ideological.
We found the role of the EIP-SCC being akin to a mechanism of adjustments of opportunities and a platform which allocates funding, displays pre-packaged solutions for various stakeholders, and favours exchanges within already determined boundaries of cooperation. As Springer (2016) suggests, the assumed decentralising tendency of neoliberalism in eroding the state is a myth which both proponents and adversaries claim. For Davies (2017) too, "neoliberalism has always looked to the state to reshape society around its ideals". In other words, we maintain that smart city initiatives driven and supported by the EC funding regime work to create new markets for technology industry and providers, laying the ground for a climate of confidence and less risky private investments. We individuated three specific forms of governance through which this process of marketization takes place: technical solutionism, nudging behaviour, and scaling/replication. Thus, we would argue that such supranational strategy for 'citizen-focused' smart cities acts as a smokescreen to a much more deliberate neoliberal agenda for cities while circumscribing a particular role for their citizens.
On the one hand, in fact, the policy horizon foreclosed by initiatives like the EIP-SCC 'citizen-focus' cluster seems to reload a matrix of socio-economic relations which sits comfortably with neoliberalism, as both an ideology and a policy agenda. The EIP-SCC original focus on an overall energy and transport industry-led solutionism via computer-operated and networked technologies brings forth a very specific and pre-packaged vision of the future city.
At the same time, its policy agenda adopts this ideology and translates it into a programme: this includes privatisation/outsourcing of services, further splintering of infrastructural provisions, and a general sense that the market, rather than the state, can allocate common resources more efficiently.
On the other hand, the forms of participation envisioned in the 'citizen-centric' smart city are very often instrumental rather than empowering in a political sense, that is, the main objectives and aims of a project have already been decided elsewhere, reinstated at the moment of bidding for funding within the application constraints, and finally reinforced with projects outcomes computed in the forms of "spreadsheets" and "technical deliverables". Parallel to the top-down deployment of resources and services, the EIP-SCC Commitments support overwhelmingly a notion of citizenship which is paternalistic and stewardship-like, modelling from below a specific form of post-political participation (e.g., Swyngedouw, 2011). We would argue this is due to a salient transformation in the way in which citizens and the state are supposed to interact through de-centred and self-disciplining forms of governmentality (Peck, 2012) . The intense monitoring smart citizens/learners are subject to in the spaces of everyday life, in fact, "shifts the governmental logic from surveillance and discipline to capture and control … through the use of systems that are distributed, ubiquitous and increasingly automated, automatic and autonomous in nature" (Kitchin et al., 2017b: 3) . It is as if the smart city has been so successfully framed as "post-political" that being a smart citizen is simply understood as living in and seeking to implement a smart city planned elsewhere.
For us, the limited forms of citizen engagement and citizen power enacted within smart city initiatives means that we need to re-imagine what it means to be a 'smart citizen', for instance, asking: If cities are to be used as testbeds -"living laboratories" (H2020-SCC, 2016, page 113) -for super-connected, technologically mediated smart districts, how can we ensure that they provide a common resource and benefit all citizens? How can environmental resilience and smart technologies enable the reduction of "social exclusion, inequalities, marginalisation, poverty and degraded urban environments" while enhancing health, quality of life, well-being and security of citizens, "particularly among the less privileged social classes" (H2020-SCC, 2016, page 112)? In our view, how citizens are expected, and expect themselves, to participate should be grounded in a much more politically active discourse of rights and urban commons.
In other words, how can we re-imagine the driving ethos for smart cities, one rooted in rights, entitlements, community, participation, and ideals beyond the market?
